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Abstract—We provide an empirical analysis of pool hopping
behavior among 15 mining pools throughout Bitcoin’s history.
Mining pools have emerged as major players to ensure that the
Bitcoin system stays secure, valid, and stable. Individual miners
join mining pools to benefit from a more predictable income.
Many questions remain open regarding how mining pools have
evolved throughout Bitcoin’s history and when and why miners
join or leave mining pools. We propose a heuristic algorithm to
extract the payout flow from mining pools and detect the pools’
migration of miners. Our results showed that payout schemes
and pool fees influence miners’ decisions to join, change, or
exit from a mining pool, thus affecting the dynamics of mining
pool market shares. Our analysis provides evidence that mining
activity becomes an industry as miners’ decisions follow classical
economic rationale.
Index Terms—Bitcoin, Bitcoin mining, mining pools, pool
hopping, visual analytics
I. INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin mining as a term refers to Bitcoin’s proof-of-
work protocol. Nakamoto proposed the protocol to solve
the double-spending problem in digital currencies and to
prevent individuals from tampering with the blockchain [1].
Bitcoin miners compete to solve a computation-intensive task
to propose a new block in the network. They receive financial
rewards for each block they successfully mine. These rewards
consist of the block reward fixed by the protocol and transaction
fees from transactions in the mined block. Practically, individual
miners receive a reward only occasionally, relative to their
computational power. As more miners join the network [2]
and with faster mining hardware available [3], the total
computational power of miners (called the hash rate) has been
growing rapidly [4]. The mining difficulty is set by the protocol
relative to the hash rate [5] so the probability of mining a
new block with the same hardware becomes lower as hash
rate increases. Therefore, the expected reward of an individual
miner diminishes with more competition. In order to overcome
this problem, mining pools have emerged in which miners
combine computational resources to gain a more stable and
predictable income.
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Fig. 1. The overview of Bitcoin mining activity. The diagram shows the
interactions between individual miners, mining pools, and the Bitcoin protocol.
Nowadays, mining pools dominate the Bitcoin mining
activity as known mining pools contribute ≈99% of the total
hash rate [6]. Bitcoin mining is an economic activity with
three main agents: mining pools, individual miners, and the
Bitcoin network as shown in Fig. 1. First, mining pools are in
competition with one another to attract more miners in order to
gain a higher market share and have a better chance to obtain a
mining reward. Mining pools distribute the rewards they collect
to their individual miners and keep some amounts of rewards
for their profits (pool fee). Second, individual miners invest
in computational resources to receive a mining reward. They
decide to enter a pool (new miners), move to another pool
(pool hoppers), exit from mining activities (dropout miners),
or even participate in multiple pools (cross-pooling miners).
The migration of miners directly affects mining pools’ market
shares. Third, the Bitcoin network regulates the mining activity
by automatically adjusting the mining difficulty every 2,016
blocks (≈2 weeks) according to the total hash rate in order to
maintain the block discovery rate at 10 minutes. The network
also pays the reward to the successful miners and sets the
block reward. The block reward started with 50 BTC per block
from the genesis block (block 0) and is reduced by half every
210,000 blocks (≈4 years).
Documenting the evolution of mining pools is of major
interest for evaluating the future of Bitcoin, and more generally,
of blockchain-based technology. A better understanding of the
impacts on pools’ growth or decline of both external (e. g.,
market price, regulation) and internal (e. g., payout scheme,
pool fee, share of transaction fee) factors is critical to assess
the viability of this industry, and thus the sustainability of
proof-of-work cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin.
Mining pools are major players in Bitcoin mining that
influence how stable, secure, and trustworthy the currency is.
Joining or leaving a pool is a decision miners make not only to
increase their short-term mining rewards but also to counteract
the possible domination of pools in the network. In return,
migration flows affect how mining pools set their policies (e. g.,
payout schemes and pool fees) to compete in the market. The
combination of these activities and behaviors related to mining
are not yet well understood and few methods exist that allow to
study mining pools. We contribute to a new approach to detect
miners’ migration (called pool hopping) among mining pools.
First, we developed an algorithm to extract reward payout
flows based on the concept of transaction purity. Then, we
obtained a list of miners for each payout flow and detected
the miners that migrated between pools. Next, we derived
quantitative measurements to evaluate miners’ migration flows
(e. g., pool hopping and cross-pooling). Finally, we visualize
miners’ migration among 15 mining pools throughout Bitcoin’s
history. We highlight the existence of regular patterns of miners’
entry, hopping and cross-pooling behaviors in comparison to
different payout schemes and pool fees.
II. RELATED WORK
Some previous theoretical work related to pool hopping
analysis has applied game theory to explain the motivation
behind pool selection and miners’ migration [7].
Lewenberg et al. [8] showed that miners are motivated to
switch between pools to increase their expected rewards due to
non-linear reward payout incentives and communication delays
between mining pools. Schrijvers et al. [9] compared the payout
schemes between proportional and Pay-Per-Last-N-Shares
(PPLNS) in an optimized incentive compatibility condition.
They showed that only PPLNS is incentive compatible. Liu
et al. [10] considered the hash rate and the block propagation
delay as metrics in their analysis. They found that miners’
strategies will converge at the market equilibrium when there
is a dominating strategy and no miner can switch pools. A
recent work by Altman et al. [11] studied non-cooperative game
competition over mining resources with constrained resource
allocation. Their model suggests that only two major mining
pools would dominate the network, unless the market is not
stabilized or miners are not fully rational.
In contrast, our work relates more closely to other empirical
work that has attempted to detect miners in mining pools and to
analyze miners’ migration patterns among pools in the Bitcoin
network.
Belotti et al. [12] investigated pool hopping between
KanoPool and SlushPool between April 6–20, 2016. The
authors found that a few miners tried to exploit the time
difference of reward payout between two pools with diverse
strategies to gain a small profit gain. Romoti et al. [13]
presented reward payout flow patterns of three pools: BTC.com,
AntPool, and ViaBTC, between block 510,000 and 514,032
(≈4 weeks) and detected overlapped miners in those pairs.
They detected high cross-pooling between BTC.com and
AntPool probably because both pools are owned by the same
company, Bitmain. Xia et al. [14] developed a visualization
tool showing the internal address networks of mining pools
and the estimated number of pool hoppers. This past work
is closely related to ours but we deviate in several areas. We
propose a miners’ migration flow model and measurements to
detect different types of pool hoppers over long time intervals.
Our extraction method is also less computationally expensive
approach although it shares a similar underlying concept to
detect miners.
Overall, compared to the majority of past work, we look
empirically at a higher number of mining pools across Bitcoin’s
mining history. Moreover, we compare our result with external
information (e. g., market shares, payout schemes, and pool
fees) to help explain pool hopping behavior.
III. POOL HOPPING DETECTION
Our research approach involved extracting members of
mining pools and measuring pool hopping behavior. Our
process includes three steps: (A) we obtain the mining reward
for each block and attribute it to a known mining pool; (B–C)
for each coinbase transaction, we extract the reward payout
flow and detected pool members (miners) of the mining pool;
and (D) we identify miners who participated in 15 mining pools
over time and migrated between pools. We provide the data
about mining pool attribution and miner’s migration at [15].
A. Mining pool attribution, market shares, and characteristics
Mining pool attribution. First, we identified the mining
pool that mined each block in the Bitcoin blockchain. When a
mining pool mines a block, it receives the mining reward from
the coinbase transaction of the block. A coinbase transaction
combines the block reward from the Bitcoin network and
transaction fees from every transaction in the mined block. It
also includes a coinbase string inserted by the miner. For
each coinbase transaction, we attributed the mining pool
based on the address matching or coinbase string pattern. We
initially used the dataset from Romiti et al. [13] that compiled
known mining pool tagging until block 556,400 (2018-12-31).
After this block, we continued their procedure and tagged
pools until block 650,731 (2020-09-30) with the datasets from
Blockchain.info [16] and BTC.com [17]. We labeled the blocks
that did not match any known mining pool as “unknown.” We
stored this data as an “attribution table.” Table I shows the
total number of blocks we found for each mining pool.
Mining pool market shares: We define the market share
of a mining pool as the percentage of the blocks it mined
compared to the total blocks mined in a month. We used our
attribution table to calculate each pool’s monthly market share.
Mining pool characteristics: We obtained information
about pool characteristics, in particular payout schemes and
pool fees, from the Bitcoin Wiki page [18] on the topic. We
downloaded the page’s edit history and manually cleaned the
data for each month by comparing it with the information from
TABLE I
LIST OF MINING POOLS THAT RECEIVED MORE THAN 1,000 BLOCK
REWARDS. ROWS HIGHLIGHTED IN GREEN COLOR ARE THE 15 MINING
POOLS WE STUDIED IN THIS WORK.
Mining Pool Blocks Total Rewards First Block Last Block
F2Pool 58,174 1,101,804 2013-05-05 still active
AntPool 51,211 883,692 2013-12-07 still active
SlushPool 33,640 755,910 2012-01-26 still active
BTC Guild 32,936 1,010,779 2011-11-10 2015-06-30
BTC.com 31,814 403,201 2016-09-05 still active
DeepBit 31,107 1,508,254 2011-02-25 2013-11-28
GHash.IO 23,083 579,128 2013-08-04 2016-10-24
BitFury 20,901 420,027 2013-11-14 2020-03-25
ViaBTC 18,640 239,882 2016-06-05 still active
BTCC Pool 18,036 363,493 2014-10-21 2018-09-25
BTC.TOP 15,896 211,808 2016-12-11 still active
Poolin 15,142 175,971 2018-07-02 still active
BW.COM 12,733 250,044 2015-01-29 2018-11-09
Eligius 11,430 338,236 2011-06-14 2017-11-22
50BTC 7,859 198,651 2012-12-18 2014-06-02
KnCMiner 7,477 185,427 2014-02-25 2016-09-12
BitMinter 6,464 205,382 2011-11-07 2019-08-12
EclipseMC 6,024 212,395 2012-02-10 2016-03-02
Huobi 5,904 65,243 2015-06-01 still active
Bixin 5,753 80,640 2016-06-12 2019-09-01
BitClub Network 5,672 88,892 2015-04-02 2019-11-06
OzCoin 4,845 187,123 2011-12-30 2014-09-24
ASICMiner 3,146 79,279 2013-05-20 2014-04-09
1THash&58COIN 3,067 30,635 2019-08-25 still active
okpool.top 2,750 27,820 2018-12-27 still active
Bitcoin.com 2,465 32,944 2016-09-21 still active
KanoPool 2,432 46,359 2014-10-14 2020-07-26
GBMiners 2,093 28,980 2016-08-30 2018-04-15
DPOOL 1,918 24,398 2018-03-31 2019-05-11
1Hash 1,895 29,268 2016-03-04 2017-12-07
Telco 214 1,830 40,109 2014-12-19 2017-08-23
CloudHashing 1,824 45,745 2013-10-04 2015-02-14
21 Inc. 1,508 37,996 2015-04-09 2016-03-01
WAYI.CN 1,306 16,364 2018-02-14 still active
Polmine 1,290 32,365 2013-04-12 2015-06-07
the Bitcoin Forum [19]. As a result, we constructed panel data
that includes all changes in pool characteristics over time.
Finally, we merged the mining pool market share data with
the Wiki data. For many mining pools in the attribution table,
the Bitcoin Wiki did not contain additional data. Therefore,
we selected the top 15 mining pools that we found in both
the Wiki data and the attribution table for our study on pool
hopping behavior (highlight in green color in Table I).
B. Transaction flow and transaction purity
We introduce transaction flow graphs and the transaction
purity definitions before applying them to our payout flow
model and heuristic algorithm.
Definition 1. A transaction flow is a directed graph of Bitcoin
transactions from a seeding transaction. Each node represents
a transaction tx in the transaction flow. A transaction has a
timestamp attribute time. Each directed edge corresponds to a
value transfer from a transaction to another. Therefore, whether
it is the input or the output of a transaction depends on the
direction of the edge. An edge contains the information about
the amount of transferred value, and the public-key address
of the owner. Each edge contains references to the receiving
transaction node receive and spending transaction node spend.
We adopted a transaction purity measure to determine how
much Bitcoin value in the transaction is received from the
seeding transaction. This measure is commonly used for taint
analysis in Bitcoin (e. g., [20], [21]).
Definition 2. Let tx.in and tx.out be sets of receiving (inputs)
and spending (outputs) edges of a transaction tx respectively.
The transaction purity is recursively defined as being the
average purity of the input transactions weighted by their




e∈tx.in purity(e.receive) · e.value∑
e∈tx.in e.value
(1)
The purity of a transaction without inputs is 1 because it is
the root transaction in the transaction flow.
C. Mining pool payout flows
After a mining pool receives the mining reward from a
coinbase transaction, the pool has to distribute the reward
to pool members. Even though mining pools distribute the
reward to individual miners in different patterns [13], [22],
we introduce the payout flow model as a transaction graph
consisting of four transaction types: coinbase ( txcoinbase),
payout ( txpayout), intermediate ( txinter), and miner
( txminer). Examples of reward payout flows are shown
in Fig. 2.
1) A mining pool receives mining rewards from coinbase
transactions txcoinbase and collects them in a payout
transaction txpayout before distributing it to miners.
2) A mining pool distributes the reward from txpayout
to intermediate transactions txinter before splitting
rewards to pool member (miner) addresses.
3) Pool members receive the reward from txinter and
spend it in a transaction we call miner transaction
txminer. We assumed that pool members receive the
reward from this flow and then combine it with other
Bitcoin values outside the flow to spend in txminer.
Therefore, the purity of txminer is < 1.
Based on this model, the reward payout flow is the Bitcoin
transaction flow from a payout transaction txpayout to
pool members txminer . We considered txpayout as the
seeding transaction because it collects every mining reward
and distributes it to pool members.
Extracting reward payout flows. We devised Algorithm 1
to automatically extract payout flows from the coinbase
transactions in the Bitcoin blockchain. We used the BlockSci
API [23] to access the transaction data. We initiated the list of
txpayout from all outputs of txcoinbase as inputs to the
algorithm. For each txpayout, we traversed the transaction
graph from txpayout which has purity = 1 until the
transaction has puritytx < 1 (i. e. txminer). The algorithm
returns a directed edge list that represents the payout flow.
We added two additional termination criteria valid(tx) that


















































































































Fig. 2. Representative examples of reward payout flow patterns from the mining pools in our study. The flows were extracted using our algorithm and are
represented as node-link diagrams. Here, we sampled the payout flow in the month where the mining pool had the highest market share. Each node represents
a transaction type with branches of similar patterns grouped together. The color of the node indicates the transaction type. The total value of transactions in
each node is encoded by circle size in proportion to the txpayout value. The number of transactions and their combined value are the top and the right labels
for each node respectively. We omitted labels for combined values below 1 BTC.
Algorithm 1: Reward payout flow extraction
Input : txpayout is a payout transaction as a seeding
node of the payout flow.
Output : edges is the edge list of the the payout flow.
queue← PriorityQueue([txpayout]);
edges← List();
while queue is not empty do
tx← queue.pop();
if purity(tx) = 1 and valid(tx) = True then






time difference between txpayout and tx is more than one
day and (2) when the tx.value is < 0.001 BTC—as most
mining pools have a minimum payout value [12], [14].
Identifying individual miners. For each edge list obtained
from Algorithm 1, we constructed a payout flow graph using
the NetworkX library [24]. Representative payout flow patterns
that we obtained from the algorithm are shown in Fig. 2. Next,
we extracted the txminer and derived the list of miners
from each payout flow graph.
Definition 3. Miner transaction txminer is a transaction
in the payout flow graph that does not have any output in
the payout flow graph |txminer.out| = 0. We tagged all input
edge(s) of txminer as owner edges. The list of miners who
received the reward from txpayout is defined as Mtxpayout .
Some txminer transactions may be connected to the pool
wallet to keep the represented value as profits for the pool or
as deposits for the next payout, as illustrated in Fig. 2 (c) and
(f). We detected txminer input edges that have the same
owner addresses as the mining pool and assigned them as
txpayout to extract further reward payout flows.
Payout flow patterns: We visualized payout flow patterns
for all mining pools in our study and show representative
flows patterns in Fig. 2. Early mining pools, operated from
2011 until mid-2015, distributed the reward directly after every
block it mined. We found two payout patterns in this period:
(1) the long chain of payout flows distributing the reward to a
single miner at each step, e. g., DeepBit (a), BTC Guild, and
GHash.IO; and (2) the direct payout to miners after receiving
the mining reward, e. g. SlushPool (b) and Eligius.
After mid-2015, most mining pools tended to collect the
mining rewards in their wallet and to distribute the reward
to miners regularly (i. e. daily). We also observed two payout
patterns (1) the chain of payout flow distributing the reward to
multiple miners at each step, e. g. AntPool (e), BTC.com (f),
BTCC Pool, and Poolin; and (2) the indirect payout to miners
on an txinter, e. g. F2Pool (c). We also noticed that F2Pool
(c) and BTC.com (f) usually send half of their payout back to
their addresses as a reserve to pay miners in the next payout.
D. Miners’ migration between mining pools
To analyze miner migration between pools, we compared
the list of miners who received rewards from each mining pool
in a set time interval and calculated the intersection of miners
between pools. We set the time interval to months to be able
to analyze detailed patterns for the entire mining pool history.
Definition 4. Let t be a time interval where t ∈ T = {t0, ..., t−
1, t, t+ 1, ..., tn}. The set of miners in the mining pool M tpool
is the summation of the miner list Mtxpayout for all payout






Fig. 3. The miners’ migration flow model of pool at time interval t. t− 1
(t+ 1) is the time interval before (resp. after) t. Mnew (Mdrop) is the list
of miners not in any pool at t− 1 (resp. is not found in any mining pool at
t+ 1). The union of the list of miners from other pools is Mothers.
The miner’s migration flow is modelled as a diagram in
Fig. 3. For each time interval t, the list of miners that migrate
from/to a mining pool pool, M tpool, is divided into 7 miner
groups as follows:
• New (Dropout) miners are miners that enter (exit) the min-
ing activity at time t, annotated as Mnew|pool (Mdrop|pool).
• Same before (Same after) miners are in M tpool but are
also in M t−1pool (M
t+1
pool).
• Hopping in (Hopping out) miners are in M tpool but move
from (to) other pools M t−1others|pool (M
t+1
others|pool).
• Cross-pooling miners are in M tpool but also receive a
reward from other pools at the same t (M tothers|pool).
We estimated the quantity of miners’ migration as the
percentage of the total value for each miner group. We report
the percentage of value rather than the number of addresses
because it gives more weight to miners that have a high
contribution to the pool and therefore the measure is more
robust regarding small or occasional miners.
Definition 5. The percentage of the total value of miners (X)
is the total value of M tpool associated with Mx, where x is a








For example, the percentage of hopping in (hopping






For each mining pool, we obtained the monthly percentage
of miners’ migration for each miner group. To understand
the flow of miners in a mining pool, we summarized miners’
migration flows into a net gain or loss metric for the pool from
different flow types with (1) New and dropout flow: the percent
difference between new and dropout miners; (2) Hopping in
and out flow: the percent difference between hopping in and
hopping out miners; and (3) Cross-pooling: the percentage of
cross-pooling miners.
Additionally, we calculated the percentage of cross miners’
rewards from the pool as the total reward that cross miners
received from the pool divided by the total reward that cross
miners received from all mining pools. A higher percentage
implies that miners dedicated more computational resources to
this particular pool. It also indicates the attractiveness of the
pool compared to other pools at the same time interval.
IV. DISCUSSION ON THE POOL HOPPING DETECTION
In this section, we discuss the validity and quality of our
approach and compare it to related work. All confidence
intervals are 95% bootstrap CIs.
A. Assumptions and limitations of the approach
Our approach rests on the assumption that individual miners
who receive a reward share will spend it in a transaction that
includes input transactions from outside the flow. The algorithm
will make a false classification when a miner simply forwards
the reward using a transaction without further inputs. In this
case, the algorithm will calculate that the transaction purity is
1, assign it as txinter, and follow all outputs from txinter.out.
To detect migration patterns, we also assume that miner
addresses are reused. We are aware, however, that miners can
always generate new addresses. As a result, our percentage of
new and dropout miners is an upper bound. In our data, each
miner address received a reward from a pool on average 18.1
[15.4, 21.4] times. We summarize the miners’ migration flows
into net gain or loss metrics to reduce the impact of miners
who change their addresses within the same month.
Although the basic address clustering method [25] is an
effective method to group the addresses that are likely to belong
to the same entity [26], we found that it led to false-positive
clusters. For example, the method may group different miners
in the same cluster because they used the same exchanges or
mixing services. We expect that miners would participate in
1–2 pools at a time. We report the average number of mining
pools that miners participated as the average weighted by their
total reward. During the first halving (second halving) period,
we found that miners receive the reward from 3.92 [3.12,
4.74] (3.06 [2.47, 3.68]) different pools per month compared
to 1.46 [1.39, 1.56] (1.30 [1.24, 1.37]) pools per address.
The percentage of cross-pooling per month using address
clustering is on the average of 25.9% [24.2%, 27.6%] (31.6%
[29.7%, 33.7%]) higher than using solely miner addresses, with
pairwise comparison for the same pool and month. Therefore,
we decided to use miner addresses to avoid adding errors from
the address clustering to the results.
B. Miners addresses association with known entities
Since there is no ground truth to evaluate the identity
of individual miners, we indirectly validated whether our
approach can identify individual miners correctly. We posited
TABLE II
THE PERCENTAGE OF ADDRESSES AND TOTAL BITCOIN VALUES
ASSOCIATED WITH KNOWN ENTITIES FROM 2013-01-01 TO 2016-12-31
Type Addresses Total ValueInput Miner Output Input Miner Output
Unknown 96.1 84.8 91.5 44.0 84.8 68.6
Mining pool 1.38 0.555 7.43e-2 45.9 6.02 0.371
Exchange 1.42 8.36 4.80 0.35 6.52 18.0
Wallet 0.428 4.38 2.67 7.62 2.48 12.6
Marketplace 0.665 1.19 0.567 2.14 0.162 0.398
Gambling 3.46e-2 0.609 0.347 1.86e-4 3.25e-2 5.07e-2
Mixer 1.15e-3 5.51e-2 3.69e-2 1.16e-5 6.57e-3 3.57e-2
Lending 5.03e-3 4.54e-2 2.86e-2 3.68e-5 1.50e-3 1.51e-3
the assumption that miners should receive a mining reward
(input address) from the mining pool and keep it in their wallet
(miner address) before spending it (output address) on services
(e. g. exchange, mixer, or marketplace). We used a known entity
dataset from WalletExplorer.com with entity type classification
from Zola et al. [27]. We report the percentage of addresses
and Bitcoin values for each entity type in Table II. We studied
the payout flows that spent between 2013-01-01 and 2016-12-
32 because the website stopped updating more known entities
from 2016 [28]. In summary, we found:
1) Miners detected from our algorithm mostly cannot be
associated with any known address (“unknown” type in
Table II) (84.8%) as well as input and output address
(96.1% and 91.5% resp.). However, when we measured
the total value for each entity type, we found that
84.8% of miner rewards are from unknown addresses,
compared to 44.0% for input and 68.6% for output
addresses. Therefore, we show that our algorithm can
detect individual miners because they are largely not
associated with any known Bitcoin entities.
2) Miners tend to receive a reward from known mining pool
addresses (45.9% of the total value) followed by unknown
addresses (44%). This result aligns with our assumption
that miners should receive the money from txinter of
the mining pool. For unknown addresses, mining pools
may use external addresses that are undetected in the
known entity dataset to pay miners.
3) Miners spent 68.6% of their total value using unknown
output addresses. We also detected that some miners spent
their reward on exchanges (18% of the total value) and
wallet services (12.6%). This result provides evidence that
regular miners convert mining rewards to fiat currencies
or deposit them to their Bitcoin wallets.
Our approach differs from Xia et al.’s work [14] as we do
not filter out known entities after we extract the payout flow. We
have three reasons for this choice: (1) Xia et al. focus on only
a 1-month time frame. The WalletExplorer dataset, however,
includes 30,167,518 labeled addresses. It is computationally
expensive to linearly scan for addresses in every transaction;
(2) WalletExplorer does not update new entity labels after
2016 [28]. Hence, it cannot be applied to recent reward payout
flows; and (3) Our measurements based on the percentage of
value are tolerant to possible misclassification of miners.
V. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF POOL HOPPING BEHAVIOR
We calculated miners’ migration statistics for 15 pools that
adopted three main payout schemes: Proportional, Pay-Per-
Share (PPS), and Pay-Per-Last-N-Shares (PPLNS). We explain
miners’ behavior in the Bitcoin network based on rational
behavior in economic theory and provide visual evidence
that some characteristics of mining pools (e. g. market shares,
payout schemes, pool fees) affect miners’ mobility.
Bitcoin mining has become an industry where miners gather
into pools to maximize their investment in mining devices [29].
Choosing a pool becomes a strategic economic decision for
miners as a pool’s characteristics greatly affect a miner’s
income. First, we focus on the competition between pools
based on payout schemes and transaction fees. Then, we
investigate market entry and the expected revenue of new
miners. Finally, we analyze miners’ cross-pooling behavior
that helps to diversify income and risks.
A. Pools’ competition, fees and pool hopping
In the competition to attract miners, payout schemes and pool
fees are major pool characteristics that directly impact miners’
income. We illustrate that fee and payout schemes exhibit the
usual economic evolution observed in the competition context in
Fig. 4 (a). Our previous work [30] showed that the Proportional
payout scheme was used at the beginning of Bitcoin. Over time,
mining pools switched progressively to PPS and PPLNS payout
schemes. As PPS and PPLNS are more robust to pool hopping
than the proportional reward [31], these payout schemes are
more attractive for pool managers. Our empirical result is in
line with prior work as Proportional payout scheme disappeared
in 2013. After that, PPS and PPLNS became the dominant
payout schemes among the large pools.
A second explanation for the growing use of PPS and PPLNS
relies on their different but complementary risk/return ratios.
PPS pools pay miners in proportion to their contribution to the
pool and thus provides risk-free, low income. All the risk is
supported by the pool, which needs then to create a reserve
of money to be able to pay the miners during ‘bad luck’
periods. In comparison, PPLNS pools pay only those miners
who contributed to the last N shares in a given time window.
Miners who contribute but leave the pool before a block has
been mined might not get any reward. Therefore, PPLNS lefts
all the risk to the miners, and the expected reward variance
is higher compared to PPS [31]1. These two payout schemes
can be viewed then as two different financial assets. For this
purpose, it is noticeable that the fees applied to these two
financial assets follow the classical two-parameter financial
asset pricing model [32]. In financial markets, risky assets
1Following Rosenfeld’s article [31], the expected rewards of PPS and PPLNS
are both equal to (1− f)pB, where B is the block reward, f is pool fee, and
p is the probability of a share to be a valid one. However, as we showed in this
paper, the PPLNS fee is lower than the PPS fee. PPLNS tend then to generate,
in the long run, higher income than PPS. Moreover, PPLNS reward variance
can be approximated following [31] by pB
2
N
, using previous notations and N
is the total number of share in a round, while each share sends to the pool in
the PPS scheme is rewarded by a fixed amount, leading to no or insignificant
reward variance.
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Fig. 4. Mining pool characteristics and miners’ migration statistics over time. We divided into three main payout schemes: Proportional (and Score only for
Slush Pool), Pay-Per-Share (PPS), and Pay-Per-Last-N-Shares (PPLNS). Each row in a graph represents the mining pool and the shape encodes whether the
pool kept transaction fees for itself (squared ) or shared with its miners (triangle N). We separated the same mining pool in different rows and facets but
provided the shadow colors (blue in a, grey in b and c) to highlight the continuity of the pool with different payout schemes and transaction fee policies. (a)
Market shares and payout schemes. The market share of the mining pool is represented as the size of the circle for each month. Pool fees are encoded as the
color scale. (b) New and dropout flow. The size of the circle represents the absolute difference between new and dropout miners. The positive (or negative)
flow of new miners are encoded as green (or red) color. (c) Hopping in and out flow. The size of the circle represents the absolute difference between hopping
in and hopping out miners. The color indicates whether hopping in miners are more than hopping out miners (green) or vice versa (red). Three grey vertical
lines in each chart indicate halving days on 2012-11-28, 2016-07-09, and 2020-05-11.
must have a higher expected return to be attractive. In the case
of Bitcoin mining, Fig. 4 (a) is consistent with this scheme
as the more risky asset (PPLNS) is likely to have a lower fee
(≈0%) compared to the risk-free one (PPS, ≈2-3%).
Pool fees are used as a competitive advantage for mining
pools. Within each payout scheme type, new pools tend to apply
a lower fee than the incumbents. For instance, DeepBit applied
a relatively high fee for PPS (10%) as the first dominant mining
pool between 2011–2012. In 2012, mining pools, such as BTC
Guild or OzCoin, applied lower PPS fees (5%) to attract new
miners (Fig. 4 (b)) and hopping-in miners (Fig. 4 (c)), probably
from DeepBit which had more hopping-out miners in the same
period. We see the same pattern in 2013 when F2Pool (4%,
named Discus Fish at the time) or 50BTC appeared (3%), then
in 2014 with AntPool (2.5%) or BTCC (2%), and in 2016
with BTC.com (1.5%). This competition led to a decrease in
the average PPS fees implemented by pools which stabilized
around 2% from 2016. The same dynamics occurred for PPLNS
pools. While BTC Guild has applied a 3% fee since 2011,
50BTC created in 2012 applied a lower fee (2.5%). This trend
got stronger with GHash.io (0%) in 2013 or AntPool (0%) in
2014. When these pools appeared with lower fees, new miners
were attracted by those pools (Fig. 4 (b)) and hopped out from
older pools (Fig. 4 (c)).
Summary: The market share of mining pools is a confounding
factor with miner flows. Mining pools that gain market share
tend to attract new and hopping-in miners. Miners drop out and
hop-out from pools that lose market share. This feedback loop
probably explains the domination of a few mining pools at a
time. The main driver of pool-hoping we observe in this article
is the gap between pools fee for a given reward scheme. New
successful pools adopted lower fees to attract miners while the
older ones declined or stopped operating if they did not follow
this trend. After 2015, pool fees tended to converge for each
reward scheme, and pool-hoping decreased.
B. Bitcoin value and mining market entry
Another evidence for the economic rationale of mining
activities comes from the incoming flow of miners during
bitcoin’s high valuation periods. Fig. 4 (b) provides infor-
mation about the new miners joining Bitcoin mining pools.
Bitcoin experienced 8 local high valuation periods before
2020: 06/2011 ($19), 04/2013 ($130), 12/2013–03/2014 ($800),
06/2014 ($600), 12/2015 ($420), 06/2016 ($630), 05–12/2017
($15,000) and 06–12/2019 ($10,500) [33]. These periods are
characterized by many new miners entering pools and even
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Fig. 5. Cross-pooling miners. Each row represents the percentage of cross-
pooling for each mining pool over time. The percentage of reward that cross-
pooling miners obtained from the pool is encoded as the color scale. Three
selected periods that we focused on are highlighted in the grey background.
pool creations. Bitcoin mining became an economic investment
as demonstrated in Prat and Walter [29] and acquisition of
mining hardware tends to increase when its expected return
rises. The corollary is that miners exit the market when Bitcoin
value decreases. Fig. 4 (b) shows indeed large miner dropout
close to halving days, which correspond to periods of sharp
decrease in mining revenue.
C. Bitcoin values, income optimization and cross-pooling
Cross-pooling allows to diversify risks and optimize income.
Fig. 5 (c) provides interesting insights into cross-pooling prac-
tice. Three periods of intense cross-pooling can be observed:
04/2013–11/2014, 06/2014–12/2014, and 11/2016–01/2017.
These three periods exhibited an economic rationale where
miners seem to diversify their risk between risk-free pools
(PPS) and more risky ones (PPLNS).
In particular, the first two periods corresponded to a similar
pattern, which is the rise of cross-pooling from PPS pools to-
ward PPLNS ones. The first period (04–11/2014) corresponded
to the switch from PPS toward PPLNS scheme for BTC Guild.
BTC Guild applied PPS until February 2013, then proposed
PPS and PPLNS until March 2014, and after offered uniquely
PPLNS. Before that time, cross-pooling was very low. It seems
that the availability of PPLNS reward has attracted miners
operating on pools using PPS (F2Pool or Eligius) or Score
(SlushPool) as shown in Fig. 6 (a).
The second period (06–12/2014) followed a similar pattern,
except for AntPool (a newly created pool). Before the creation
of AntPool, cross-pooling was limited. Once AntPool launched
the PPLNS payout scheme (in addition to PPS), cross-pooling
rose considerably. Fig. 6 (b) shows that cross-pooling occurred
between the main PPS (Eligius and F2Pool) and PPLNS pools
(AntPool, BTC Guild and GHash.IO).
The last period of intense cross-pooling (11/2016–01/2017)
followed the same rationale but the timing was different. In
this period, neither the creation nor the switch toward a PPLNS
pool led to cross-pooling. However, the apparition of a large
PPS pool (BTCC Pool) generated a lot of cross-pooling with
an already existing PPLNS pool (AntPool). Fig. 6 (c) shows
that a large flow of cross-pooling existed between AntPool and
BTCC Pool, and also other PPS pools (BTC.com or F2Pool).
In all the cases reviewed above, we demonstrated that cross-
pooling is used to diversify miners’ risk and leads them to
combine mining in risk-free pools (PPS) and more risky ones
(PPLNS). In this respect, individual miners seem to act as a
portfolio manager who optimizes their income concerning the
risk associated with each type of asset.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We contribute a new approach to extract reward payout
flows of mining pools and to detect individual miners from
the payout flow. We provide rationale and evidence that our
approach based on the general payout flow model can be used
to extract payout flows with different payout patterns. We also
propose the miner’s migration flow to measure the mobility of
miners who enter, exit, hop, or cross between mining pools.
Based on these algorithms and metrics, we provide an
analysis of miners’ migration among 15 mining pools across
Bitcoin’s history. The visualizations allow us to highlight
regular patterns of miners’ entry, hopping, and cross-pooling
behaviors. These regularities are consistent with classical
economic behaviors under competition. Our work provides new
empirical evidence that miners and mining pools behave as
typical economic agents, seeking to maximize their profits. We
show in particular that pools’ competition is based especially
on pool fee and payout schemes. The most popular current
payout schemes, namely Pay-per-Share (PPS) and Pay-per-Last-
N-Shares (PPLNS), can be seen as two different financial assets
from a miner’s viewpoint: a free-risk scheme (PPS) and a more
risky one (PPLNS). Consistent with the economic rationale,
the more risky one is associated with more expected returns
due to the lower pool fee associated with PPLNS. Moreover,
miners tend to perform cross-pooling with pools applying
different reward schemes seemingly for risk diversification and
income optimization. This is especially the case during high
Bitcoin value periods where expected income from mining
gets higher, in particular for the PPLNS payout scheme. These
periods are then associated with important levels of new miner
entries and cross-pooling from PPS pools toward PPLNS
ones. Additionally, pool fees are major drivers of the pool’s
competition. We show that new pools tend to apply a lower
fee with respect to incumbents. It leads to a decrease in the
average pool’s fee along time and is correlated with important
pool hopping decisions toward new pools. Our result provides
an insight into the dynamics of mining pools, which is crucial
for improving regulations and policies in cryptocurrencies.
The data obtained from our approach provides rich and
detailed information on miners’ migration among pools. The
data is publicly available at [15]. For future research, we are
planning to develop a quantitative model to explain miners’
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Fig. 6. Cross-pooling among mining pools during three periods: (a) March–November 2013, (b) June–December 2014, and (c) November 2016–February 2017.
The stacked bar chart shows the total reward distributed from each mining pool during the period as a proxy for the pool size. Mining pools are sorted from
the highest to the lowest value. Each bar is separated by the total amount of non-cross-pooling miners (in blue) and cross-pooling miners (in orange). The
heatmap shows the percentage of the total cross-pooling miners from mining pools on the y-axis to other pools on the x-axis.
particular, the econometric analysis might be useful to check
if the trends highlighted in this empirical work still hold when
controlling for confounding variables. On the other hand, we
are developing a visual analytics system to explore and monitor
Bitcoin’s mining activities in multiple coordinated views. The
tool will allow mining pool managers, individual miners, and
Bitcoin data analysts to analyze the miner’s migration flow
in granular details, and to relate the information to pool
characteristics and other relevant Bitcoin indicators.
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